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Lessons from Health Reform
by Trish Riley

A

s full implementation of the Affordable
Care Act (ACA) unfolds, it’s hard not
to reflect upon Maine’s experiences with
health reform. Certainly Maine’s Dirigo
Health reform is a microcosm in this
sea of change, but a full decade after its
enactment the similarities are striking.
Both reforms created subsidized, private
health insurance, negotiated by an independent entity; both expanded Medicaid
and included strategies to improve quality
and lower cost; and both met with strong,
well-organized conservative opposition.
States have long experimented with
health reform, and in 2003 Maine led the
next wave, enacting Dirigo Health Reform.
A campaign promise in John Baldacci’s
race for governor, it became law his first
year in office, after considerable work and
compromise that won strong bipartisan
support but only by changing the underpinnings of the program.
Always controversial, Dirigo survived
numerous assaults. Governor Paul LePage
campaigned to end the program, but
instead the program continued and
accepted new enrollees, albeit with
reduced funding. And, just as Baldacci’s
bipartisan advisory group recommended,
Dirigo will sunset on December 31, 2013,
as enrollees transition to the ACA’s health
exchange.
A quick review of Dirigo’s accomplishments:
• Covered 40,498 people and 994
businesses with affordable commercial insurance and annually funded
MaineCare coverage for about
6,500 low-income parents.1
• Established an independent agency,
like Massachusetts and the ACA
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that followed, that negotiated with
insurers and bargained on behalf
of members for more affordable
and quality products.2
• Brought new competition to the
market—the nonprofit Harvard
Pilgrim Health Plan routinely
ranked best health plan by the
National Committee for Quality
Assurance, became the Dirigo
insurance carrier.
• Responded to the market, establishing a voucher program, helping
low-wage, part-time workers buy
their companies’ insurance and
programs for displaced workers
and those with pre-existing conditions. Unlike Massachusetts or the
ACA, Dirigo subsidized workers
in small businesses, not just individuals and families.
• Provided financial incentives for
members to select a primary care
physician and make appointments
for wellness visits—a precursor
to the “medical home” supported
through the ACA today.
• Covered preventive services with
no co-pays required, a provision
now part of the ACA.
• Bucked national trends by reducing
the number of uninsured in
Maine, despite the deepest recession since the Great Depression,
when employer-sponsored health
insurance was waning. In 2003,
America’s Health Rankings listed
Maine 18th among the states
lacking health insurance; in 2011,
Maine was sixth best in the country.

• Linked access to health coverage
with efforts to limit costs and spur
quality. Dirigo established voluntary targets that limited hospital
costs to a three percent growth rate;
created a state health plan to guide
decisions about the health system
and to limit how much new technology, equipment and buildings
Mainers needed and could afford;
and launched the Maine Quality
Forum, advocating for high-quality
health care and helping consumers
make informed healthcare choices.
The ACA establishes a new Patient
Centered Outcomes Research
Center to improve quality of care
nationally. Dirigo also limited how
much insurers could spend on
marketing, profit and other administrative expenses, a provision now
included in the ACA
Despite these accomplishments, Dirigo
remained controversial. Why? First, the
reform established public subsidies for
private coverage, anathema to those
seeking purely market-based solutions.
Second, Dirigo’s initial funding strategy,
including a plan to use significant federal
Medicaid funds, was not fully implemented. Insurance companies were
expected to trim their costs, negotiate
better rates with providers and reduce
overall cost growth so that a fee assessed on
insurers could be absorbed by cost savings
and not passed on to premium payers.
Today, the Institute of Medicine
reports that the U.S. wastes $750 billion
annually in avoidable health care spending.
In 2003 the public and policymakers were
not convinced that the system was capable

View current & previous issues of MPR at: digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/mpr/

THE MARGARET CHASE SMITH ESSAY

of cost reductions and the insurance
industry enjoyed strong support among
key policymakers from both parties. As a
result, the industry succeeded in allowing
the fee to be passed on to premium payers.
The Chamber of Commerce raised
concerns about the cost of the pass
through and, with insurers, challenged the
assessment up to Maine’s Supreme Court
where it was upheld. But, just as with the
ACA, a favorable court decision does not
end controversy.
Each year the Dirigo Health Agency
was required to document and prove savings
in the health care system before collecting
the assessment. That process was costly and
contentious; each legislative session saw
bills to alter or repeal the program. Even
bills correcting problems were amended to
add language to weaken Dirigo. The 2008
legislature enacted new funding for Dirigo,
a beverage tax, but conservative organizations launched a successful “no new taxes”
citizen referendum campaign that rolled
back the funding.
Like the ACA, Maine built its
coverage initiative on a Medicaid foundation. Although the original plan to
use federal Medicaid dollars was revised,
Dirigo did support the expansion of
Medicaid to cover parents of Medicaideligible children, using program revenue
to match federal dollars. And like the
ACA, Dirigo included reforms intended
to reduce costs. For example, Dirigo
proposed a global budget to hold hospitals
to fixed rates of growth in exchange for
more authority over how to best deliver
care. Rather than the fee-for-service system
that rewards procedures, this proposal
would pay for good outcomes. Hospitals
argued, correctly, that they could not be
held to a global budget unless it included
physicians and other key players who
directly influenced health care costs. The
global budget was replaced with voluntary
targets and a new law allowed hospitals to work together, free from antitrust
constraints, to develop systems of care,

laying a framework for the Accountable
Care Organization—integrated systems of
care, supported by the ACA.
The Dirigo reforms were not all
successful, but the controversy, like that
surrounding the ACA, created a challenging environment. A strong tea-partylike group declared Dirigo a failure before
it had a chance to prove its mettle. Much
of the criticism focused on Dirigo’s enrollment rates, even though the compromises
that won bipartisan support resulted in
less funding to meet the original enrollment targets. However, the program failed
to recalibrate and project new enrollment goals, allowing critics to claim the
program overpromised. But the program
continued, thanks to a strong board and
staff, political leadership and support
from enrollees.
Several years after Dirigo launched,
Massachusetts created a similar plan,
providing subsidies and linking eligible
individuals to private coverage or Medicaid.
Why was Massachusetts able to pull off
their reform—much of which mirrored
Maine’s—without the controversy Maine
experienced? First, Massachusetts had
enacted a law decades earlier that required
employers to either provide health insurance or pay a fine. Although repealed
before implementation, it undoubtedly
provided lessons for the new proposal.
Second, the Massachusetts plan did not
include cost-containment proposals as
Maine did and it won important business and provider support.3 A significant,
longstanding federal payment to supplement Massachusetts’ hospitals was ending.
Without it, the state’s hospitals would experience a budget hole of $385 million—a
loss that would shift costs to the private
sector. Massachusetts needed to retain
those dollars and proposed to do so by reinvesting them to subsidize health coverage.
The state requested and received a waiver
from federal rules that allowed those funds
to be used to fuel the reform and save
hospitals and business from big losses.
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So what are the lessons of Dirigo
Health?
Separate the facts from the rhetoric:
For Dirigo, the compromises that changed
and reduced funding were obscured by
rhetorical attacks. Little attention was
given to Maine’s benefit design, its highly
successful system of enrollment and eligibility for subsidies or its still unique ability
to provide those subsidies to employees
of small businesses. Similarly, few early
reports about the ACA discuss successful
state exchanges—in October half of the ten
states reporting enrollment were exceeding
federal enrollment targets.4 Nor do reports
make clear that the federal government
had a much bigger job than originally
intended. Historically states seek flexibility
and control to run federal programs. In
the case of the ACA, having so many states
cede authority to the federal government
to run the exchange placed a far greater
demand on the federal apparatus.
Controversy and complexity can be the
enemy of political will and challenge
effective implementation:
Elected officials listen to the drumbeat
of criticism and, balancing numerous
demands before them, grow quickly frustrated with implementation challenges.
That leads to calls for oversight and
change. Attending to those calls requires
precious time of administrators trying to
run the program and fuels public perception about problems without providing
balance about what may be going right.
The oversight role is a critical check and
balance; keeping elected officials engaged
is essential but not always easy. In Maine,
some legislators who railed against the
program and regularly voted against it, in
practice used the program and accepted
its subsidies to insure their small businesses. In the Congress, many of the
same members who criticized the ACA
and repeatedly tried to repeal it now raise
sanctimonious voices decrying the web
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site delays that keep their constituents
from getting coverage
Keep going and stay flexible:
Ideological fights will continue, but the
focus needs to be on the program and the
facts. Is the web site improving? If not,
are workarounds in place? Is it increasing
coverage? Is it affordable? A program as
significant as the ACA is bound to have
implementation problems; Medicare
and Medicaid did, as did the rollout of
Medicare’s drug benefit. Program implementers need to be flexible to respond
to problems, and Congressional leaders
need to allow the time for that to occur.
Expect the criticism to continue:
The rollout of the ACA has been challenging. The high call and web volume
facing the new federal exchange may
not be a good baseline against which to
measure enrollment, but expect to hear
the naysayers declare the program a failure
because it enrolled far fewer than those
who visited the web site. Of course, when
the national exchange opened, it wasn’t
just interested customers who visited. The
press, researchers, students, and possibly
people eager to crash the system, logged
in to the site.
Medicaid matters:
Some Dirigo funds provided the state
dollars needed to generate federal matching
funds. Because of the federal contribution,
Medicaid was a cost-effective way to serve
the lowest-income enrollees. The Supreme
Court ruled that states could not be
required to expand Medicaid under the
ACA, but without that program—and its
shared federal and state financing—the
ACA cannot reach its goals

ACA is landmark legislation designed to
redress those problems. To do so requires
significant change across the health care
system and for all of us. And change is
not easy.
Maine’s Dirigo reform reflects
the challenge of change and the value
of moving forward. The controversy
died down, and the program operated
smoothly, demonstrating how a subsidy
program for private health insurance
can be run. While many in Maine think
the program ended, it quietly and effectively brought health coverage to nearly
1,000 Maine businesses and at least
47,000 individuals. The ACA deserves
the opportunity to reach its goals of
making more people eligible for subsidized health care, supporting innovation
in how care is delivered and paid for,
investing in public health and prevention, and beginning a national conversation about how best to achieve a
high-performing, affordable health care
system for our nation. -

Trish Riley is a
senior fellow at
the Muskie School
of Public Service,
University of
Southern Maine
and a lecturer at
George Washington University. She held
appointed positions under five Maine governors and was the principal architect of Dirigo
Health Reform. She served as executive
director of the National Academy for State
Health Policy and is a member of the Kaiser
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured
and of the Medicaid and CHIP Payment and
Access Commission.

ENDNOTES
1. Dirigo Health Agency, Oct. 2013.
2. However, the Dirigo Health Agency,
poised to become the state’s exchange,
will be phased out as the state elected to
have the federal government take on that
work in Maine.
3. However, in 2012 Massachusetts enacted
legislation that will limit the overall
growth in health care costs to growth in
the state’s economy.
4. “The Mixed State of Health Care
Exchanges,” New York Times (October
27, 2013). The table also includes the
District of Columbia, which was not
meeting enrollment targets, and other
states not yet reporting enrollment.

Keep your eyes on the prize:
The U.S. spends twice what other developed nations do for health care, yet we
leave millions of citizens without coverage
and get no better health outcomes. The
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